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 Beyond Marketization? 
The Genesis of Quality Assessment Criteria in the 
British University Sector between 1985 and 1992 
 
LAURA GIOVINAZZI* 
(Naples Eastern University) 
 
 
Abstract 
This brief article is a consideration on the theme of Quality Assessment (QA) criteria in 
the British university sector. It will attempt to shed light on a variety of 
conceptualisations on this instrument which is commonly considered  a means to 
achieve a more efficient university sector which can prosper by working on the quality 
of education that is delivered to students whilst at the same time responding to reforms, 
which have pushed for a greater “value-for-money” of public resources used by 
universities. Whereas the majority of recent literature give an overview of the current 
state of the university system, this article instead sheds a focus of quality assessment 
criteria on an aspect which is treated as a marginal detail, namely, the historical origins 
of these criteria. By bringing some historical evidence to the forefront, this article will 
show how an attentive reflection on the birth of quality assessment criteria can show 
some problematic aspects of literatures which tend to explain and study QA as 
instruments that contain a logic of some sort. When literatures of different approaches 
prioritise a logic at work for explaining the functioning of QA criteria, this article 
argues, they tend to ignore that the conception of QA was vested with a variety of 
interests of different agents. 
 
Keywords: new public management, neoliberal governance, quality assessment criteria, 
British university sector, managerialism. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The decline of the welfare state and the global fall in profit rates of the 
1980s has revived discussions on the transformations in the governance of the 
public sector in the neoliberal era.  Amongst the sectors most influenced by 
Margaret Thatcher’s attacks on the inefficiency of the public bodies1 is the 
                                               
*  Laura Giovinazzi is a PhD student in International Studies at the University of Naples 
l’Orientale, Italy. Her research analyses the development of governance of the British and 
Italian university sectors. Her broader research interests include the political economy of 
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Higher Education (HE from now on) sector, which, beginning from the 1980s, 
experienced a variety of reforms aimed primarily at reducing the costs of 
university financing. Quality Assessment criteria (QA from now on), and the 
call to greater quality of the “education service” more generally quickly became 
the defining feature of the wave of transformations, to the point that many 
changes within the university are still today considered part of this quality 
movement. As a matter of fact, the speed with which QA and benchmarks 
became strictly connected to state-funding is a peculiar aspect of the British 
university sector and has left many academics almost unable to keep up with the 
variety of changes to their social context and the traditional way of carrying out 
their profession. The fund-cutting and increased supervision of the multiple 
aspects of university work, research and teaching, has as a consequence widely 
been accepted as an effective retreat of the state from the public sector and its 
attempt to open up the universities to the external dynamics of the market to the 
point that just about 20 years from the first use of performance indicators some 
scholars suggested that the university was already a quasi-market.
2
 This is a 
label which the university sector has struggles to get rid of and has become 
indeed quite prominent in the literature’s accounts of the functioning of QA 
criteria. Indeed, QA criteria considered the instrument through which the 
establishment of competition between universities, and hence of a quasi-market, 
has been achieved.  
This paper argues that when scholars readily classify the use of QA 
criteria as a case of neoliberal governance in this way, they tend to inadvertently 
read changes in the British university sector in a retrospective manner, as if the 
emergence of these instruments were inevitable given the development of 
neoliberalism and the increasing market pressures. By large, this argument is 
driven by historical material on the genesis of QA criteria in the British 
university sector, which brings to light how a marginal attention has been given 
to a study of institutional actors’ role in shaping these instruments, falling short 
in explaining how and why university agents were not mere recipients of a 
marketization process at work. In making this claim, this paper does not claim 
to describe the current form of QA criteria in the British university sector, but 
rather to show that the historical emergence of these criteria exposes some 
tensions with accounts that treat QA criteria as “external” pressures.  
As will be argued, these criteria-which are considered part of top-down 
New Public Management (NPM) policies, emerged instead in a more complex 
                                                                                                                   
New Public Management, neoliberal governance, the development of management theory 
and managerial instruments (lgiovinazzi@unior.it). 
1  Colin Hay, “Narrating crisis: the discursive construction of the winter of discontent”, 
Sociology, vol. 30, no. 2, 1996, pp. 253-277. 
2  Roger Brown, Quality Assurance in higher education: The UK Experience since 1992, 1st 
Edition, London, Psychology Press, 2004. 
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social context of political pressures from above and the reconfiguration of 
power relationships internal to the university sector, for example they were 
initially designed within the university sector rather than being imposed on it. 
This is not to say that reforms of the 1980s didn’t generate incentive structures3 
which push universities to compete, nor to deny that state’s performance based-
funding has pushed universities to seek private sources of income, for example, 
or to work on their internal organization.
4
 Rather, this brief article 
problematizes the understanding whereby these outcomes are seen as the direct 
effect of an expanding market logic on the public sector, in favour of an agency-
centered approach which attempts to grasp the ways in which university agents’ 
attempts to shape their social context in the 1980s created radically new 
practices that are conventionally underestimated.  
This article is divided into four sections. The first section is a brief review 
of the literature which examines the relationship between QA criteria and audit 
policies. The second section presents how an agency-centred approach can 
extend beyond the borders within which these literatures move by 
conceptualising agency in dynamic terms rather than as a reaction to structural 
constraints. The third section presents a brief history of the genesis of QA 
criteria in the British university sector, arguing that university agents created 
social innovations which allowed them to rearticulate the initial scope of 
government policy. Finally, the article draws conclusions for politicising the 
process of the emergence of QA criteria in the British university sector.  
 
 
Managerial Practices and Neoliberalism 
 
In what follows, I discuss two broad approaches to managerial practices. 
The first is associated with scholars from the field of political economy who are 
interested in the way that market pressures influence state policy. The second 
group of approaches, Foucauldian and Convention theory, consider that 
managerial practices have a peculiar normative character which strengthen top-
down control over the public sector. As I will show, both approaches downplay 
the significance of QA criteria due to the way that they frame their analysis by 
referring to neoliberal structures.  
 
 
 
                                               
3  Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and hierarchies: analysis and anfitrust implications, New 
York, Free Pres, 1975. 
4  Andrew McGettigan, The great university gamble: Money, markets and the future of 
higher education, London, Pluto Press, 2013. 
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A political economy of QA criteria 
 
Amongst the variety of political economy writings, some scholars have 
read QA criteria as the instruments which enforce the market rule. Concerned 
with analysing the relationship between “the economy” and “the state” within 
neoliberalism, these authors’ starting point for conceptualising QA criteria is an 
analysis of the ways in which the state has retreated following the crisis of the 
welfare state, QA criteria being amongst the consequences of the tensions that 
have emerged in the process of stabilizing neoliberal governance. Since the 
global fall in profit rates in the 1980s and pressures of competitiveness, authors 
suggest that state retreat is visible in a rationalisation of funds and the attempt to 
remodel inefficient public sectors through incentive structures.
5
 NPM is 
therefore a new governance paradigm considered fruitful for responding to 
global pressures of competitiveness,
6
 remoulding the public sector to market 
imperatives. Considering the active role of the state in integrating the public 
sector into the market, the literature discusses the state’s new character in this 
process. Some argue that the state has “de-statized”,7 sharing its function with 
private bodies, and must “respond to its location within a global marketplace.”8  
In this framework of analysis, states retreat yet continue to effectively 
govern the public sector through market-oriented policies. The literature in fact 
stresses how QA assimilate market dynamics as they focus on a standardized set 
of benchmarks to which institutions should abide and which brings them to 
compete against each other, at the same time, QA also enhance governance at a 
distance
9
 given that the introduction and control of these benchmarks remain 
mostly in the hands of policy-makers. An interesting feature of this 
conceptualisation of the QA criteria is that they appear to be double-edged 
instruments: they are considered neutral in that they emerge from the market 
and set new standards on which institutions compete, at the same time, they are 
also instruments of governance in that they enable the state to retreat from the 
conventional public-sector provision, using new quality benchmarks to 
implement a set of performance-based formulas for allocating public funds. 
                                               
5  Brian Salter and Ted Tapper, “The external pressures on the internal governance of 
universities”, Higher Education Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 3, 2002, pp. 245-256; Christopher 
Hood and Ruth Dixon, A government that worked better and cost less?: Evaluating three 
decades of reform and change in UK central Government, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
6  Bob Jessop, The future of the capitalist state, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002. 
7  Ibidem. 
8  Sheila A. Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, Academic capitalism and the new economy: 
Markets, state, and higher education, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 
9  Rosemary Deem, Sam Hillyard and Michael Reed, Knowledge, Higher Education, and 
the New Managerialism: The Changing Management of UK Universities, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
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This competitive drive brought about by QA criteria has thus been studied 
through an analysis of the multiple characteristics of these instruments, such as 
the quantification of the use of resources through a set of calculations (cost-
benefit analysis, target-setting, benchmarking, output controls etc.). Similarly, 
to price-signaling, authors have suggested that these technicalities of QA 
criteria assimilate the market and effectively shape the interaction between 
universities as well as ‘consumers’ (i.e. students) demand. In making this claim, 
authors have essentially brought forth the idea that QA criteria can be 
considered the most efficient for distributing resources within the university 
sector, and their emergence, as a consequence, though not explicitly, is narrated 
in such functionalist terms: they respond to the inefficiency brought about by 
the decline of the welfare state by bringing the market into public sectors. In 
fact, some accounts consider QA criteria as essentially isolated from broader 
complexities of the socio-political context in which they emerge, QA criteria 
“stand above, indeed outside wider social, moral and political struggles.”10 The 
advent of QA in the public sector is largely explained as the result of an 
adaptation to strong markets.  
The (excessive) focus on the technicalities of these instruments has led 
authors to consider the advent of QA criteria as serving the interest of “the 
market” more generally, depicting the power of the state (and even more of 
universities) as subsumed to that of the market. As a result, an increasing 
number of literatures have focused on the changing identity of the post-welfare 
state, creating a relationship whereby with time the state increasingly behaves 
as a market actor.
11
 The tendency to frame the complex process of NPM as the 
case of an expanding logic which reshapes state functions has tended, in fact, to 
strengthen an analytical gap between politics and economics in many of these 
accounts, explaining state decisions for incentivising competition in the 
university sector to constraints rather than to a more complex study of possible 
interests for such a radical change in governance. In other words, the idea that 
the implementation of QA criteria in the university as well as other sectors is 
“efficient” for the purpose of a retreating state has effectively de-politicised a 
wide variety of transformations within public sectors, starting from the very 
birth of QA criteria. Consequently, the coupling of QA criteria to market-like 
instruments has opened up new typology of discussions which have diverted the 
attention of scholars away from the historical genesis of these instruments in the 
public sector towards an assessment of the extent to which the university (as 
other public sectors) has marketized.
12
 These contributions offer insights that 
                                               
10  Ibidem. 
11  Ewan Ferli, Louise Fitzgerald and Andrew Pettigrew. The new public management in 
action, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
12  Andrew McGettigan, The great university gamble: Money, markets and the future of 
higher education, London, Pluto Press, 2013. 
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allow to break down many current transformations particularly in the funding 
regimes of the university sector, yet in presuming that marketization is an 
exhaustive category through which the university sector can be studied, these 
accounts focus more on how governance through QA criteria has eroded the 
power of state or university agents rather than possibly being enhanced. Indeed, 
the market is treated as an all-encapsulating force which allows to draw-out a 
general trend in both the emergence and effects of QA criteria in public sectors 
almost homogeneously.   
 
 
New public management as an ideological project 
 
In what follows we will discuss how the Foucauldian and convention 
theory approaches to the study of managerial practices attempt to politicise the 
assumed market logic of the QA criteria. These scholars have problematized the 
understanding of NPM as just a case of the “marketization” logic at work by 
studying the mechanisms through which QA criteria reproduce asymmetrical 
power relationships, through a rejection of a dichotomic understanding of QA 
as “efficient” instruments for overcoming state/market tensions. According to 
these approaches, the competitive element of these instruments is not to be 
studied through the technical form of the criteria, but discursively. The ability 
of managerial criteria to transform the public sector lies in the normative and 
performative ways in which discourses on efficiency achieve competition, 
rather than in their resemblance to market or private logics at face value.  
 
 
Foucauldian approaches 
 
Discussions on the NPM as a new ideological paradigm
13
 have raised 
questions of legitimation into the debate on how QA are used for governing the 
public sector. At a closer look, in fact, managerial practices are said to have 
increasingly bureaucratized the public sector through auditing mechanisms 
which are radically transforming conventional institutional dynamics. Focused 
on analysing how audits bring “every specific moment of individual existence 
back to a process of valorization”14 foucauldian approaches suggest that the 
peculiarity of auditing technologies lies in the ways in which these instruments 
                                               
13  David Watson, “Quality Assessment and ‘Self‐regulation’: the English Experience, 1992–
94”, Higher Education Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 4, 1995, pp. 326-340. 
14 See Stefano Lucarelli, in Andrea Fumagalli and Sandro Mezzadra, Crisis in the global 
economy: financial markets, social struggles, and new political scenarios, vol. 1, 
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2010, p. 19. 
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consensually reproduce hegemonic power relationships between governors and 
subjects of governance.
15
 Some foucauldian approaches argue that the discourse 
on quality criteria is used in a new frontier of capitalism - cognitive capitalism - 
which exploits immaterial as opposed to manual labour.
16
 They suggest that as 
managerial practices which reformulate academic work as “output” and 
quantify a qualitative form of labour, quality assessment criteria succeed in 
exploiting academic labour consensually. Indeed, as Power
17
 argues in The 
audit society, the constant and all-encompassing supervision which audit 
technologies impose at all levels of society (between as well as within sectors) 
and the countless number of criteria which measure the most banal procedures 
of work end up subjecting individuals to the pressures of supervision to the 
extent that these become actively concerned with compliance to audit criteria. 
This leads agents to inadvertently reproduce and legitimate practices of 
surveillance, basically self-disciplining their actions in line with efficiency 
discourses and practices. In turn, this ends up strengthening an overarching 
control at a distance, legitimating NPM ideology as a new governance paradigm 
where the political project of “making everything auditable”18 is realized 
through a chain reaction mechanism:  
 
“Quality auditing works both as the specific monitoring and reporting part of the system  
and  also, importantly,  as  the  verification  of  the  system structure as a whole i.e. the 
integrity of the entire loop  of  self-observation  which  this  procedural structure 
represents. This epitomises control of control.”19  
 
Here, the ideological shift to NPM articulates power through audits, 
achieving consensual conformity to the new hegemonic paradigm and an 
effective transformation of the sectors that are audited.  
 
 
Convention theory and the economic logic at work 
 
Along similar lines, Convention theory approaches
20
 depict managerial 
policies of quality assessment as expressions of the endeavour to legitimate a 
                                               
15  Michael Power, The audit society: Rituals of verification, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
16  Andrea Fumagalli and Sandro Mezzadra, Crisis in the global ... cit. 
17   Michael Power, The audit society: ... cit. 
18  Ibidem. 
19  Michael Power, “The audit society—Second thoughts”, International Journal of Auditing, 
vol. 4, no. 1, 2000, pp. 111-119. 
20 Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, “The sociology of critical capacity”, European 
journal of social theory, vol 2, no. 3, 1999, pp. 359-377; William Davies, The limits of 
neoliberalism: Authority, sovereignty and the logic of competition, London, Sage, 2016. 
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notion of competition by inserting an economic logic into non-economic 
realms.
21
 This school of thought breaks down the political interests behind 
framing society in economic terms. Given that “neoliberalism is characterized 
by the production and legitimation of inequality”22 an intrinsic activity of 
neoliberalism is to conceal these inequalities to the rest of society by 
constructing theories and methodologies which perpetuate an idea of equal, 
economic competition. From this reading, ideas thus shape how inequalities are 
perpetuated, and the strength of an economic logic lies in its apparent neutral 
and a-political spirit. Such theoretical considerations on the normative aspect of 
NPM discourse -entrenched in managerial policies that advocate quality 
assessment- are extremely useful for scholarly attempts to deconstruct how 
power relationships are reproduced through NPM policies. When stressing how 
setting economic benchmarks make political action appear un-authoritative 
because it is accountable to a set of quantitative analyses more so than to a set 
of moral values, authors debunk the notion of quality criteria as “fixing” 
instruments by capturing ways in which the competitive economy is socially 
constructed by the neoliberal, authoritative state. This also allows to uncover 
how power relationships, as a corollary, are considered the product of discursive 
practices. For example, Davies argues that the decline of the utility-
maximization theory since the 1950s led to a shift in neoliberal discourse 
towards meritocracy. Here, the rhetorical capacities of the appeal to 
quantification for assessing governance have enabled to depoliticize the agency 
of states by framing political action as economic in essence (given that 
economic benchmarks become the final instruments for judging policy 
outcomes). It is in this sense that NPM policy, for these authors, is considered a 
performative policy. As Davies stresses,
23
 a key example of this is the rhetoric 
on national competitiveness.  
Authors’ emphasis on the normative aspect of state discourses suggests 
that NPM policies are largely the result of the state’s ability to set the 
boundaries within which agents can reproduce a new rationality, revealing how 
QA criteria serve to exert the neoliberal state’s power rather than being 
instruments that are required by the economy to fix the market-state tension as 
the political economy literature theorizes. Foucauldian and convention theory 
delve into the political intentions for establishing an audit society and overcome 
                                               
21  “Any critical analysis of neoliberalism as a historical period...must also draw on an 
interpretation and genealogy of neoliberal ways of thinking, measuring, evaluating, 
criticizing, judging and knowing...for social relations to be organized into reasonably 
persistent, reliable and peaceful institutions, at some point there must be a shared sense of 
normativity, a shared basis on which to distinguish between people and between things 
and make evaluations of their relative worth.” in William Davies, The limits of 
neoliberalism: ... cit. 
22  William Davies, The limits of neoliberalism: ... cit. 
23  Ibidem. 
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the tendency to see the state as constrained by an inevitable marketization of 
politics by stressing how competition is discursively constructed in order to 
centralize state control over the society. These last two approaches give a 
different reading to the use of QA criteria, one which highlights how discourses 
can establish power relationships, yet their focus is excessively centered on the 
ways in which powerful agents use discourse, and inevitably their conclusion 
suggests that “powerful agents will formulate powerful discourses.”24 Though 
overcoming the Political Economy approaches’ dichotomic frame of analysis, 
this paper argues that the above-mentioned approaches portray, in a different 
manner, a structuralist study of the emergence of QA criteria by focusing 
excessively on a voluntaristic form of emergence. Similarly, to the functionalist 
reading of the PE approach, this literature sees QA criteria as strictly 
instrumental to the development of neoliberal policy, placing the historical 
specificity of these instruments of governance at a secondary level of analysis. 
This is due to the fact that these authors identify social change, such as the 
quality criteria used for NPM policy, only in cases where they witness a change 
in state rationality, as if social change depended uniquely on changing logics 
within dominant structures rather than on the social interaction and relationships 
within society and the diversity of these aspects within different institutional 
contexts.  
In other words, though recognizing that “the market” or “competition” 
are socially constructed, authors neglect the diversity of ways in which the 
discourse on competition can be perceived by a multiplicity of agents. The 
ability of states to discipline society rests on individuals’ reproduction of the 
new forms of governance at a discursive level, making institutional actors mere 
recipients of policy and subjects of reproduction. In this way, power is seen as 
deriving from the structural layout of society and appears to be already 
comprehensible before looking at concrete practices of other agents.
25
 As a 
result, “institutional and discursive diversity is treated as a minor detail which is 
analytically insignificant.”26 Thus, although criteria are considered central to 
governance, historical studies on the institutional context from which QA 
criteria have emerged remain marginal in the abovementioned literatures.  
 
 
                                               
24  See Samuel Knafo, “Critical approaches and the legacy of the agent/structure debate in 
international relations”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 3, 2010, 
pp. 493-516 for a discussion on an agential conception of power. 
25  Samuel Knafo, “Critical approaches and the problem of social construction: reassessing 
the legacy of the agent/structure debate in IR”, 2008, available online at 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/12534/ (Accessed 4 December 2018). 
26  Andrea Lagna, Deriving a normal country: Italian capitalism and the political economy 
of financial derivatives, Diss, University of Sussex, 2013. 
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Towards an Agency-Centred Approach 
 
These a-historical studies on the emergence of managerial practices tend 
to underestimate the difficulty that state actors have in turning policy into 
practice, and parallel to this, obscure the ability of non-state agents to make a 
pragmatic use of state discourse.
27
 This leads to neglect the ability of non-state 
agents to rearticulate policy in their own terms. In line with an agency-centred 
approach, this paper wishes to stimulate a critical reading of social change 
which can problematize the ways in which agents create their own social 
conditions within existing structures as often this creates innovations that are 
difficult to explain in structural terms. This means problematizing how practices 
are the result of a variety of attempts of a multiple agents to remould their social 
context.
28
 Critical theory has done much to uncover ways in which structures 
condition people to act in given ways, yet often this has been reified into a 
conception of agency as limited to a reaction to structures (also discursive 
ones). In some cases, this has led scholars to identify “institutional” reactions to 
policies using behavioural shortcuts to explain agency.
29
 This paper argues that 
the significance of discourses is only partially understood when it is 
conceptualised in structural terms, because authors fail to problematize how 
social actors relate the discourse to their own social context, and in so doing 
transform the dominant discourse by reinterpreting it. Conceptualising 
legitimation in performative terms
30
 becomes problematic for understanding 
how new social practices can emerge from contextual power relationships: 
 
“the contraction of the elbow room available to some always finds its counterpart in 
others enhanced capacity to shape and manipulate the dynamics of social life.”31 
 
The implication of these theoretical approaches is that the specificity of 
the emergence of managerial instruments is studied in its normative elements 
but rarely in historical or social terms, because the state’s discursive capacity is 
considered a sufficient element to understand social change in the university 
sector. This does not allow to understand in what ways QA criteria in the 
                                               
27  Samuel Knafo, “Critical approaches and the problem of social construction: ...” cit.; 
Martijn Konings, “The pragmatic sources of modern power”, European Journal of 
Sociology/Archives européennes de sociologie, vol. 51, no. 1, 2010, pp. 55-91. 
28  Samuel Knafo, “Critical approaches and the legacy of the agent/structure debate in 
international relations”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 3, 2010, 
pp. 493-516. 
29  Martijn Konings, “The pragmatic …” cit. 
30  Michael Power, The audit society: Rituals of verification, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1997; William Davies, The limits of neoliberalism: Authority, sovereignty and the 
logic of competition, London, Sage, 2016. 
31  Samuel Knafo as cited in Martijn Konings, “The pragmatic …” cit. 
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university sector reflect, by large, also a transformation of power relationships 
for university agents involved in the process of social change.  
Having demonstrated how the literature conceives managerial practices 
as instrumental to the change of the structural power of the neoliberal state, or 
of neoliberalism more generally, this article will now present a brief history of 
the genesis of the QA criteria in the British university sector. By studying the 
social context of the British university sector in the 1980s, the aim is to bring an 
account of the transformative actions of university agents and show how 
attempts to “relate to changing social reality in order to modify it”32 brought 
about social innovations that may be considered the first steps towards the 
development of performance-based funding.  
 
 
The British University Sector in the 1980s 
 
The changes to British university governance towards a mass education 
system can historically be situated following the explosion in student numbers 
in the 1960s.
33
 According to some, the need to determine new ways for funding 
this rapidly expanding sector was a crucial feature which pushed the 
government to ensure that funds went to the most demanded universities, 
drafting initial quality requirements. In this sense, some have suggested that the 
shift to mass education initiated the debate on quality of teaching and research. 
Still, government funding strategy remained unconditional throughout the 
1980s.
34
 The University Grants committee (the committee responsible for 
distributing financial allocations determined by the government, UGC from 
now on) fund allocation system was based on student numbers per university, 
and whereas governments were attempting to formulate ways with which to 
face the increasing costs of the university sector, there is little evidence to 
suggest that policy was based on performance criteria. The auditing mechanism 
in Britain was instead fragmented, with multiple bodies exerting this function, 
and no sector-wide quality assessment body. In fact, as of 1984 performance 
indicators were barely developed as part of funding allocations
35: “there are few 
                                               
32  See Samuel Knafo, “Critical approaches and the problem of social construction: ... cit., p. 22. 
33  Michael Shattock, The UGC and the Management of British Universities, Bristol, Society 
for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press, 1994. 
34   Martin Cave, Stephen Hanney, Mary Henkel, Maurice Kogan, The use of Performance 
Indicators: The Challenge of the Quality movement, 1st Edition, London, Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers, 1997. 
35  The analysis of the use of PIs for designing funding policy is complex, primarily because 
it is essential to maintain the different trajectories of PIs designed for assessing teaching 
and research respectively. The selective funding of these two activities, indeed, did not 
develop as part of a single new policy, but rather each trajectory is specific to a variety of 
attempts to introduce selectivity in university funding policy which deserve to be studied 
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indicators of teaching and performance that would enable a systematic external 
assessment of teaching quality to be made.”36 
 
 
The Jarratt Report 
 
It was in the same year that the Committee of Vice Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP from now on) united and discussed the changing mission and 
the role of the university at the time. The Jarratt report initiated a long period of 
research and work in the development of performance indicators, with the 
collaboration of multiple other bodies.
37
 Whilst much literatures have read this 
report as the demonstration of a subjugation of Vice Chancellors (VC) to an 
economic rationality imposed by the state,
38
 I argue that this report instead 
should be read as an attempt to rearticulate government policy at the time. The 
report is significant in multiple aspects. Firstly, it presents a changing role of 
vice chancellors as CEOs, who take on the lead in managing the university 
resources. Secondly, it proposes the design of Performance Indicators (PIs) as 
instruments of quantification that could facilitate decision-making within the 
university “seeing all resources as cash...has the advantage of encouraging 
considerations of all the options.”39 The report suggested initiating work on the 
development of a series of input and outputting criteria for assessing the 
efficiency of universities, in joint collaboration with the UGC.  
In a context of possibly diminishing public funds from the funding 
councils, university vice chancellors attempted to come to terms with this 
imperative by giving a new function to their institutional position. The 
imperative of possible financial constraints led VCs to come up with ways to 
demonstrate that their university deserved bigger allocation. The far-reaching 
social innovation of vice chancellors at the time was that of framing the success 
                                                                                                                   
in detailed, agential terms. This is beyond the scope of this article, for a detailed study on 
the developments of criteria for teaching and research see chapters 3 and 4 in Martin 
Cave, Stephen Hanney, Mary Henkel, Maurice Kogan, The use of Performance 
Indicators: ... cit. 
36  University Grants Committee, Planning for the late 1980s, The Resource allocation 
Process, Circular Letter 22/85, London, UGC, 1985. 
37  The CVCP worked closely with the UGC-particularly between 1984-1988. These two 
bodies created a Joint working Group which experimented and designed a set of 
evaluation methodologies.  
38  David Palfreyman and Ted Tapper, Reshaping the University: The Rise of the Regulated 
Market in Higher Education, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
39  Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom. 
Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities, & Jarratt, S. A., Report of the 
Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities, Committee of Vice-Chancellors 
and Principals, 1985, paragraphs 3.32 and 3.32e. 
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of the university in new terms, namely, as dependent on a correct financial 
resource management, a framing which was not yet explicitly part of 
government policy beyond the general call of “value for money” in higher 
education. The CVCP’s suggestion of formulating these instruments and of 
relating them to internal decision-making can hardly be read as the reproduction 
of an economic logic or the subjugation to market pressures given that 
announced changes from the government were on funding with few conditional 
criteria. A final observation on the historical context of the British university 
sector in the mid-1980s serves to critically assess the role of vice chancellors.  
 
 
The social innovations of the Committee of vice chancellors 
and principals 
 
British universities are considered the Higher Education institutions 
which have traditionally enjoyed more autonomy than other European 
universities.
40
  The CVCP is a body which has traditionally represented the 
universities vis-a-vis government and funding councils. Born in 1918, it has a 
long history of attempts to bring forth university interests and is considered a 
key committee in shaping the elite system of Higher Education up until the 
1980s when Higher Education Institutions assumed a mass purpose. As 
Dearlove has suggested, a striking feature of the Jarratt Report is also to be 
found in the CVCP’s suggestion that councils, rather than the traditional senate, 
be at the forefront of university governance. Whilst it can be erroneous to 
assume this as evidence of a class-project of the CVCP, the Jarratt report is 
undoubtedly a strikingly political document in which far-reaching changes to 
the university sector are presented.
41
 To some extent, the legacy of this report 
may be evident, as some authors have suggested, in internal university politics 
after the Jarratt report. It is a manifestation of interests that can be generalized 
as means of exerting power over others by making use of the university 
structure in light of an unexpected imperative which may have threatened to 
diminish the power of Vice chancellors. The point here is precisely to 
demonstrate how the Jarratt report reflects the CVCP’s reading of their social 
                                               
40  John Dearlove, “Fundamental changes in institutional governance structures: The United 
Kingdom”, Higher Education Policy, vol. 11, no. 2-3, 1998, pp.111-120. 
41  To some extent, the legacy of this report may be evident, as some authors have suggested, 
in internal university politics after the Jarratt report, whereby new internal governance of 
the university through accountability ethos has been implemented to strengthen top-down 
governance. For more, see Michael Shattock, The UGC and the Management of British 
Universities, Bristol, Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University 
Press, 1994; Maurice Kogan and Stephen Hanney, Reforming higher education, Higher 
Education Policy Series 50, London and Philadelphia, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000. 
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context and the ways in which it attempted to confront it. This indicates just 
how much the history of QA has been shaped by a social struggle to enter the 
discourse of university funding.  
 
 
The political leverage of performance indicators 
 
The joint collaboration of CVCP and UGC began to have practical 
repercussions when in 1985 the cuts in recurrent research grants (announced 
back in 1981) were communicated
42
 together with an upcoming, first of its kind, 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). The latter was planned to be an 
assessment of universities’ research in order to use research ratings and cost 
information to inform grant allocation and is the first example of selective 
funding in the university sector in Britain. To the entire university sector, it was 
clear that performance indicators were taking an increasingly central role in 
university governance. This sentiment grew at the wake of the 1988 Education 
Reform Act which created funding councils for universities and polytechnics. 
Even though the latter had historically been subject to different procedures of 
evaluation,
43
 this was no longer considered an advantage in a context of new 
emerging founding councils. The proposed end to the notorious binary line -
which had traditionally recognized separate institutional status between 
universities and polytechnics- augmented fears that polytechnics would be 
incorporated into universities and lost their status in the context of an emerging 
single and system wide funding council. It is in light of this imperative that 
polytechnic directors began to interrogate themselves on the ways in which they 
could have a say in the process of the design of performance indicators. An 
interesting case in the literature - which is excessively overlooked- points to the 
clash of visions that the CVCP and the Committee of Directors and 
Polytechnics (CDP from now on) had in mind for the newly emerging, sector 
wide funding council
44
 and quality assurance organization.
45
 CVCP members 
were concerned with research quality, whilst the CDP envisioned a council 
which could stress the importance of a high teaching quality. In other words, 
both groups were keen to have the new council place greater importance on the 
                                               
42  University Grants Committee, Planning for the late 1980s, Circular Letter 12/85, London, 
UGC, 1985. 
43  Roger Brown, Quality assurance in higher education: The UK experience since 1992, 
London, Routledge, 2004. 
44  DES, White Paper Higher Education: A new Framework, London, HMSO, Cm 
1541,1991. 
45  Roger Brown, Quality assurance in higher education: ... cit. 
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academic activity that they were best at.
46
 As Brown
47
 has argued, the CDP was 
struggling to water down the assessment scheme because it feared that if the 
new funding council was composed of CVCP majority, this would have 
downgraded the Polytechnics’ teaching efforts in favour of the Research 
universities. Both parties, though involved in the design of a new funding 
council, were struggling to advance their majority in the institutional 
membership of what would become the HEFCE.  
 
 
Conceptualising Competition in the British University Sector 
 
This brief history of the contestation of the contents of quality criteria, 
which would later be used by HEFCE to begin the development of conditional 
funding
48
 serves to problematize to what extent competition between university 
criteria can be said to emanate from the managerial instruments such as QA 
criteria. Readings of this sort tend to neglect the historical tension of different 
parties determined to influence the design of QA criteria, readily concluding 
instead that competition is an inherent characteristic of these instruments. As 
this paper has attempted to show, this is a retrospective reading which can 
distort the social context from which the criteria emerged, along with the ways 
in which the political struggles between the CDP and CVCP achieved victories 
- as well as losses - which continuously altered the definition of “quality”. The 
genesis of quality criteria (and in particular their association to funding) 
however-when studied within its peculiar historical context-emerges as a grey 
area in which no party (vice chancellors, polytechnic directors, government 
funding councils, quality assessment bodies) has had a definite form of control. 
In future research, it would be interesting to analyse the development of QA 
criteria and conditional funding after the genesis of performance indicators, 
studying how the contestation over these developments has changed in different 
social contexts and through time, attempting to see which different groups are 
involved in this contestation and why. As Khurana’s study49 on US business 
schools suggests, the ability to control the parameters through which 
                                               
46  “This will help the PCFC to champion the interests of the sector, particularly in the 
context of its annual negotiations with the secretary of state...over the future scale of 
public expenditure on higher education” see paragraph 1.3 in Morris Report, Performance 
Indicators: Report of a Committee of Enquiry Chaired by Mr. Alfred Morris, London: 
PCFC, 1990. 
47  Roger Brown, Quality assurance in higher education: The UK experience since 1992, 
London, Routledge, 2004. 
48  Ibidem. 
49  Rakesh Khurana, From higher aims to hired hands: The social transformation of 
American business schools and the unfulfilled promise of management as a profession, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010. 
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universities are assessed has always been a concern for universities, primarily 
because the control over the criteria through which an institution is assessed can 
allow it to circumvent  competition or, in other terms, attempt to control it by 
defining quality in its own favour.
50
 This implies that quality criteria should not 
be conceptualised in abstract terms, and that approaches which conceive power 
as being entrenched in structures tend to reify the political dimension of their 
genesis and development within the British university sector. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has argued that the way in which social actors relate to their 
social context is a historical matter that cannot be abstracted precisely because it 
is concerned with the way in which agents adjust and innovate in order to relate 
to changing social contexts in the attempt to exert influence over others.
51
 In 
light of this, arguments which posit that QA criteria represent the advent of an 
“economic logic” exerting pressure upon a “university logic” miss this point 
and limit the study -and consequently the significance- of social change within 
the university sector. As I have attempted to show, different scholarly 
approaches rarely consider the socio-historical dimension of the emergence of 
managerial instruments such as QA in the British university sector, for they are 
excessively focused on an analysis of the state as the mediator of global market 
pressures. This means that the connection between the emergence of the QA 
criteria in the university sector and NPM policies are understood as a product of 
a neoliberal rationality. This paper has problematized the emergence of QA 
criteria making a first step towards the problematization of this commonly used 
association. It has shown how crucial it is to consider the pragmatic use of 
discourses, given that the socially constructed fabric of society makes the 
control over discourse difficult if not impossible. Scholars’ assumption that 
states control the ways in which discourses or practices are contextually used 
and implemented leads to assume, to an extent, that the discourse on quality was 
hegemonic from its inception and was reproduced in society and in diverse 
institutions with specific histories and sets of internal power relationships. As 
has been shown, this argument is problematic when situated historically in the 
context of the British university sector, given the ways in which VCs gave new 
meanings to quality when they designed Performance Indicators, practically 
                                               
50  It is worth considering how structuralist readings on managerial instruments in the 
university sector fail to include an analysis of how the university agents act in relation to 
QA criteria and changing benchmarks. Instead these accounts tend to stress the ways in 
which quality assessment emanate market-like competition in either discursive or 
practical terms, conceptualising these instruments as inherently competitive.  
51  Samuel Knafo, “Critical approaches and the problem of social construction: ...” cit. 
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attempting to reshape the notion of quality to suit their specific context. As I 
have attempted to argue in contrast to the Political Economy literature, QA 
criteria in the British universities can be argued to have historically become an 
instrument of governance also due to the fact that they were so deeply contested 
by different agents which attempted to appropriate them, rather than being 
market-like instruments which govern the public sectors due to an intrinsic 
ability to achieve efficiency through competition. This article has argued that 
failing to connect practices such as QA criteria to social agents can obscure the 
historical contingency of this new practice of governance, resorting to 
marketization as a “familiar” category of socio-political transformation in the 
university sector. It is in this sense that this article has argued for a different 
politicisation of the debate on how QA criteria have altered the governance of 
the university sector. According to this article, governance is conventionally 
readily considered as increasingly eroded by market dynamics or it is assumed 
to be a constant manifestation of power through the discursive practices of the 
state. The result is that these narrations present forms of governance as being 
fully comprehensible in the process of “marketization”, the umbrella term 
repeatedly used to account for the multiple and socio-historically contingent 
changes that have occurred in the university sector since the 1980s. The history 
presented has been key in advancing this argument by bringing to light a 
dynamic and changing definition of QA criteria. This article advocates that a 
study of social struggles over the use and the design of QA criteria should not 
remain marginal in future research on the changing governance in the British 
university sector. The risk would be that of depoliticising a great deal of social 
innovations in governance which were witnessed in the 1980s but may have 
initially developed even earlier. The historical development of managerial 
practices such as QA criteria can thus be more accurately studied if detached 
from the assumption that they represent the expression of other forms of 
governance -such as neoliberalism- at work. This is a task which calls for a 
comprehensive and historically-specific study on the relationship between 
managerial practices and new forms of governing the university sector, starting 
from a rejection of structuralist readings of social change. 
 
 
